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Abstract 
 
This study investigated how off balance sheet engagements of deposit money banks affect risk and profitability 
compositions of such banks. The study employed secondary data obtained from financial statements of five deposit 
money banks (namely, Access, Zenith, UBA, GTB and First Bank) for eleven years period (2004 to 2014). The 
descriptive and content analysis of the financial statements of the selected banks investigated revealed that Zenith 
Bank has the highest amount of off balance sheet engagement. It therefore concludes that inspite of the huge profit 
that may accrue to the deposit money bank for engaging in off balance sheet activities, it may be exposed to a very 
high risk if the unexpected happens. In view of this, this study recommends a prudent management and monitoring 
of off balance sheet activities by management, the board and Central Bank of Nigeria. This is necessary to ensure 
that banks remain within the approved threshold or limits of off balance engagements inorder not to compromise 
the confidence reposed on the banks by depositors and investors. 
 
Keywords: Off balance sheet engagement, profitability, risk, assets and liabilities 
 
Introduction 
Off Balance Sheet refers to items that are effectively assets or liabilities of a company but do not appear on the 
company’s balance sheet. Items that are considered off balance sheet are generally ones in which the company does 
not have legal claim or responsibility for. Off‐balance‐sheet items include assets that the bank does not control, but 
where it may have some exposure to losses — for which it is most likely being paid a fee or is remunerated in some 
other way. However, they can result in future losses for the company who held them and by this, determine the 
financial health of a company. For banks and financial institutions (relevant to our study), these items often 
materialize in securitizations, liquidity lines, guarantees, acceptances, committed credit lines and total other 
potential liabilities, to the extent that these are disclosed. Off-balance sheet (OBS) items for banks include forward 
contracts of clients, bank guarantees and bankers' acceptances (acceptance is a bill of exchange drawn on and 
'accepted' by a bank as its commitment to pay a third party in international trade). These exposures earn fee income; 
however, any slippage in this portfolio would affect the bottom-line.  
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The increase in Off Balance Sheet throughout many banking systems may be due to banks’ desire to mimic the 
business strategies of their peers. Farhi and Tirole (2009) suggest that the maturity mismatch within SIVs and 
conduits (between long-term mortgage backed assets and the short term commercial paper used to finance them) 
was a structural feature of the business models of most banks who displayed strategic complementarities with their 
peers. When authorities use monetary policy to bail out failing banks, society incurs a fixed cost which is only 
justified if sufficient banks need bailing out. Therefore each individual bank correlates its risk exposure with other 
banks, such that Off Balance Sheet risks can become systemically high. In the last decades, markets came up more 
and more complex, innovative and competitive. Off-balance sheet items, especially securitization came to be seen 
by a technique to manage risk, but also to gather liquidity for other investments, by converting the illiquid loans 
into marketable securities. 
It is therefore a critical contemporary issue in financial and regulatory institutions and markets to understand the 
effects of off balance sheet in risk and liquidity and consequently, on performance and regulation. Because of the 
accounting treatment established, these items are harder to track, and can become hidden liabilities or so called 
“Incognito Leverage”, due to risk exposure that they normally pose as seen in Enron accounting fraud. To 
understand the extent of the usage of these items, for example in 2010, Citibank had USD $960 billion in off-
balance sheet assets, which amounts to 6% of the GDP of the United States. 
Sanusi (2012) asserted that the IMF observed, the extent and severity of the crisis that began with the bursting of 
the housing bubble in the United States in August 2007 reflects the confluence of myriad of factors some of which 
are familiar from previous crises, while others are new. Expansion of securitization (not itself a new phenomenon), 
which changed incentives for lenders and lowered credit standards caused the crisis. Systems became fragile 
because balance sheets became increasingly complex (further complicated by increased use of off-balance-sheet 
instruments). In this study, we tried to study what constitute bank’s exposures under Off-balance sheet engagements, 
the probability of crystallization of the related risks, possible mitigants by banks to forestall the occurrence of such 
contingent liabilities and impact of such Off-balance sheet on continued existence of the banking institutions, should 
the risk occur. The study covered data obtained from some selected deposit money banks between 2004 and 2014.  
Chapter one which is the introduction looked at the statement of research problem. Chapter 2 will discuss the 
literature review. Chapter 3 will deal with the research method, followed by specification of the models. The 4th 
chapter will deal with data analysis and interpretation while the 5th chapter is the summary of our findings, 
conclusion and recommendations.  
Literature Review 
Off-balance sheet engagements are essentially contingent liabilities which banks face in the course of their 
operations when they are acting as agents of their customers. Brandao and Martins (2013) posited that the purpose 
of Off-balance sheet items is to generate some kind of income for the banks while transferring the associated and 
contingent risk which is outside the control of the issuing bank.  
Mills and Newberry (2005) argued that firms with poor bond ratings are more likely to engage in off balance sheet 
financing. Aside the reason adduced for the need for the use of off balance sheet financing, under the banker-
customer relationship, banks often act its customer’s agent and the customer becomes the principal. Often this is 
necessitated by the need for a bank to substitute its credit or financial soundness for that of its customers in respect 
of contracts between its customers and third parties. In cases of international (or trans-boarder) trading relations 
where buyers and sellers may not know themselves and are thousands of miles away, trust may not be taken for 
granted especially when the parties are unrelated. There may be a need to engage banks in the two nations who have 
been relating together to give some assurances for the seller (exporter) to be willing to part with his consignment; 
or the buyer (importer) to make advance payment to the exporter before the former part with his funds prior to 
receiving consignment. 
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There are cases when counterparty risks are avoided by banks coming in to substitute its financial reliability of its 
customers. Examples are in cases of say a court requiring a bail bond, or surety bond to enable them discharge or 
grant a bail. A bank is usually considered a fair risk than an individual or a firm. Hence, this may give rise to bank 
issuing its guarantee or agreeing to act as a surety or indemnifier for its customer. In whatever case a bank may 
wish to take on this liability, it is usually at a cost to the customer and a fee is charged. This improves the issuing 
bank’s profitability. Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2008) argued that banks profitability and efficiency is boosted 
with non-interest income or fees from off-balance sheet engagements.  Siems and Clark (1997) estimated bank 
profit efficiency measures that included OBS activities and found that failing to account for OBS activities has 
important statistical and economic effects on derived efficiency measures by seriously understating bank output. 
Rogers (1998) estimated cost, revenue and profit efficiency of US commercial banks by using models with and 
without OBS items. The author used non-interest income as a proxy for OBS items and employed the distribution 
free frontier (DFA) estimation method. He found that the standard models that omit OBS items understate bank 
efficiency.  
Similarly, Stiroh (2000) found that the efficiency estimates of bank holding companies over 1991-97 are particularly 
sensitive to output specification and failure to account for OBS activities leads profit efficiency to be understated. 
In a recent study, Clark and Siems (2002) tested the impact of OBS activities on the measurement of cost and profit 
X-efficiency in the US banking industry and found strong support for including OBS activities in X-efficiency 
studies especially on the cost side. European studies seem to corroborate US results. Rime and Stiroh (2003) 
examine the performance of large Swiss banks over 1996-99 and found that failure to account for OBS items, 
trading, and brokerage portfolio management activities leads profit efficiency to be dramatically understated. 
Tortosa-Ausina (2003) examined the importance of non-traditional activities in the analysis of bank cost efficiency 
for a sample of Spanish banks over 1986-1997. The author finds that average cost efficiency is enhanced when 
considering an alternative model which includes the OBS items especially for savings banks. 
Off-Balance Sheet Lending Activities  
An evaluation of off-balance sheet lending activities should apply the same general examination techniques that are 
used in the evaluation of a direct loan portfolio. For example, banks with a material level of contingent liabilities 
should have written policies addressing such activities adopted and approved by their board of directors. The 
policies should cover credit underwriting standards, documentation and file maintenance requirements, collection 
and review procedures, officer and customer borrowing and lending limits, exposures requiring committee or board 
approval, and periodic reports to the board of directors. Overall limits on these contingent liabilities and specific 
sub-limits on the various types of off-balance sheet lending activities, either as a dollar amount or as a relative 
percentage (such as a percent of total assets or capital), should also be considered.  
In reviewing individual credit lines, all of a customer's borrowing arrangements with the bank (e.g., direct loans, 
letters of credit, and loan commitments) should be considered. Additionally, many of the factors analyzed in 
evaluating a direct loan (e.g., financial performance, ability and willingness to pay, collateral protection, future 
prospects) are also applicable to the review of such contingent liabilities as letters of credit and loan commitments. 
When analyzing these off-balance sheet lending activities, examiners should evaluate the probability of draws under 
the arrangements and whether an allowance adequately reflects the risks inherent in off-balance sheet lending 
activities. (Such allowances should not be included in the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) since off-
balance sheet items are not included within the scope of FAS 5 and 114.) Allowances for off-balance sheet items 
should be made to "Other liabilities 
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Off-Balance Sheet Contingent Liabilities  
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs  
Asset-backed commercial paper programs are usually carried out through a bankruptcy-remote, special-purpose 
entity, which generally is sponsored and administered by a bank to provide funding to its corporate customers. Some 
programs will qualify for consolidation onto a bank’s general ledger. For programs that are not consolidated, a bank 
should report the credit enhancements and liquidity facilities it provides to the programs as off-balance sheet 
liabilities.  
Bankers Acceptances  
The following discussion refers to the roles of accepting and endorsing banks in bankers acceptances. It does not 
apply to banks purchasing other banks' acceptances for investment purposes, which is described in the other assets 
and liabilities section of this Manual. Banker’s acceptances may represent either a direct or contingent liability of 
the bank. If the bank creates the acceptance, it constitutes a direct liability that must be paid on a specified future 
date. If a bank participates in the funding risk of an acceptance created by another bank, the liability resulting from 
such endorsement is only contingent in nature. In analyzing the degree of risk associated with these contingent 
liabilities, the financial strength and repayment ability of the accepting bank should be taken into consideration. 
Further discussion of bankers acceptances is contained in the International Banking section of this Manual under 
the heading Forms of International Lending.  
Revolving Underwriting Facilities  
A revolving underwriting facility (RUF) (also referred to as a note issuance facility) is a commitment by a group of 
banks to purchase at a fixed spread over some interest rate index, the short-term notes that the issuer/borrower is 
unable to sell in the Euromarket at or below this predetermined rate. In effect, the borrower anticipates selling the 
notes as funds are needed at money market rates, but if unable to do so, has the assurance that credit will be available 
under the RUF at a maximum spread over the stipulated index. A lead bank generally arranges the facility and 
receives a one-time fee, and the RUF banks receive an annual commitment or underwriting fee. When the borrower 
elects to draw down funds, placement agents arrange for a sale of the notes and normally receive compensation 
based on the amount of notes placed. The notes usually have a maturity range of 90 days to one-year and the 
purchasers bear the risk of any default on the part of the borrower. There are also standby RUFs, which are 
commitments under which Euro-notes are not expected to be sold in the normal course of the borrower's business.  
Inability to sell notes in the Euro-market could be the result of a financial deterioration on the part of the borrower, 
but it could also be due to volatile short-term market conditions, which precipitate a call by the borrower on the 
participating banks for funding under the RUF arrangement. The evaluation of RUFs by the examiner will follow 
the same procedures used for the review of loan commitments. An adverse classification should be accorded if it is 
determined that a loan of inferior quality will have to be funded under a RUF.  
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Data Collection and Methodology 
Data was obtained from annual reports of 5 major deposit money banks in Nigeria comprising of Access 
Bank, First Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, United Bank for Africa and Zenith Bank. These banks were 
carefully chosen in view of the fact that their data were available and the magnitude of their share of off 
balance sheet engagement was high. The method of data analysis employed was descriptive and content 
analysis approach. 
Model Specification 
OBS =   f (PAT, GRSL, LLPR, TOTA) 
The model is explicitly re-specified as  
OBS = β0 + α1PAT + ά2GRSL + ά3LLPROV+ ά4TOTA 
Definition of Variables  
VARIABLE DEFINITION  
OBS Off-balance sheet  
Β Constant  
PAT Profit after tax 
GRSL Gross loan 
LLPR Loan Loss Provisioning Reserve 
TOTA Total Asset 
α1+ά2+ ά3+ ά4 
 
Coefficient of the independent variables  
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Data Analysis and Discussion of Rersult 
 
Table 1: Performance Indices of 
Select DMBs 
   
All figures 
in N 
billion GROSS LOAN 
LOAN LOSS 
PROV. 
RESERVE 
OFF BAL. 
SHEET 
PROFIT AFTER 
TAX TOTAL ASSETS 
ACCESS 
BANK 
           
4,453,245,346  
       
0.436,998,791  
       
3,127,365,347      0.142,614,926      9,212,374,577  
FIRST 
BANK 
           
8,782,482,000  
       
0.342,426,000  
       
2,522,633,000  0. 408,504,000    18,759,990,000  
GT 
BANK 
           
5,562,216,969  
       
0.163,013,425  
       
2,779,418,663  0. 437,556,244    11,355,816,303  
UBA  
           
5,072,708,000  
       
0.152,245,000  
       
4,010,623,000  0. 237,102,000    14,920,320,000  
ZENITH 
           
6,970,477,141  0.196,527,766  
     
10,700,367,155  0. 452,566,630    17,966,911,106  
TOTAL 
         
30,841,129,456  
       
1,291,210,982  
     
23,140,407,165   1,678,343,800    72,215,411,986  
Source: Author Compiled  
   
From table 1 above, ACCESS Bank issued approximately N4.5tn loan which is about 14.43% of the total 
gross loan offered by the five banks between 2004 and 2014, First Bank recorded N8.78 trillion to clinch 
28.48% of the total gross loan for the period under review while GTB, UBA and Zenith Bank offered 
N5.6tn, N5tn and N7tn showing about 18.03%, 16.45% and 22.6% of the total gross loan offered for the 
period.  Using Loan Loss Provisioning Reserve as a proxy for risk assessment, Access Bank loan provision 
reserve showed the sum of N437b, First Bank recorded the sum of N342.4b, GTB recorded N163b, UBA 
recorded N152.2b while Zenith made a reserve provision of N196.5b. The result shows 33.8%, 26.5%, 
12.62%, 11.78%, and 15.2% of the total loan loss provisioning reserve accrue to Access, First Bank, GTB, 
UBA and Zenith Bank respectively for the period under review. Using Off Balance Sheet activities as a 
dependent variable, the record shows N3.12tn, N2.52tn, N2.78tn, N4tn and N10.7tn which is about 13.5%, 
10.90%, 12.10%, 17.29%, 46.24% of the total off balance engagements for the five banks for the period 
2004 to 2014 respectively (that is ACCESS, FBN, GTB, UBA and Zenith). For Profit After Tax, ACCESS 
Bank recorded a PAT of N142.6b, First bank made a PAT of N408.5b, GTB made a PAT of N437.6b, UBA 
had a PAT of N237.1b whereas Zenith made a PAT of N452.6b this figure shows that 8.5% of the total 
PAT for the five banks for the period under review accrues to ACCESS Bank, 24.3% of the total PAT 
accrues to First Bank, 26.1% of the total PAT accrue to GTB, 14.1% of the total PAT belongs to UBA 
while 27% of the total PAT accrues to Zenith. 
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Discussion of Results 
From the analysis above, Access Bank issued the sum of N4.5 trillion and a loan loss provision reserve of 
N436 b at a PAT of N142b for the five years period. The difference between PAT and off balance sheet 
activities shows that better proportion of the DMBs revenue earnings emanate from off-balance sheet 
engagements.  This result is not too healthy because of the risk exposures involved with transactions of 
such magnitude and nature. The portfolio theory posits that the higher the returns the higher the risks. Of 
all the banks, Zenith Bank appear to be highly exposed due to the high amount of its gross loan and off 
balance sheet activities with a paltry loan loss provisioning. In the face of market shocks and volatility, it 
will be difficult for Zenith Bank to readjust quickly. Second to Zenith Bank is UBA with off balance sheet 
amount of N4tn and a gross loan and loan loss provisioning of N5.1tn and N152.2b respectively. First Bank 
, GTB and Access Bank appears to be the safest and less riskiest of the five banks investigated. Although 
First Bank has the highest gross loan of N8.8tn, better part of that loan was issued in the ordinary course of 
business and not as a result of off balance sheet activities. The loan loss provisioning reserve also appear 
to be adequate when compared to other banks. Its total asset stood at N18.8 tn which is the highest among 
the five banks compared. Likewise GTB and Access banks respectively. 
Table 2: Gross Loans of Selected DMBs 
GROSS LOAN =N='000 % 
ACCESS BANK 4,453,245,346 14.4% 
FIRST BANK 8,782,482,000 28.5% 
GT BANK 5,562,216,969 18.0% 
UBA  5,072,708,000 16.4% 
ZENITH 6,970,477,141 22.6% 
TOTAL 30,841,129,456 100.0% 
Source : Adapted from the annual financial statement of DMBs 
From table 2 above First Bank and Zenith Bank account for more than 50% of the gross loan issued by the five 
banks. The implication is that any merger between the two banks may resort to a kind of monopoly because of 
their financial muscle and huge asset deposits. This also shows that First Bank has the highest number of 
depositors seconded by Zenith Bank.  
 
 
Table 3: Off Balance Sheet of selected DMBs 
OFF BAL. SHEET =N='000  (%) 
 ACCESS BANK     3,127,365,347  13.5% 
 FIRST BANK     2,522,633,000  10.9% 
 GT BANK     2,779,418,663  12.0% 
 UBA      4,010,623,000  17.3% 
 ZENITH   10,700,367,155  46.2% 
 TOTAL   23,140,407,165  100.0% 
Source: Adapted from the annual financial statement of DMBs 
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The off-balance sheet table above showed that Zenith Bank recorded about 46% of the total off-
balance transactions of the five banks under investigation. The implication is that in the event of 
market shocks and uncertainties, Zenith Bank will be highly exposed. It is also an indication that 
most of its transactions are not in their primary function of financial intermediation. 
Table 4  : Profit After Tax of Selected DMBs 
PROFIT AFTER TAX =N='000 PAT SHARE (%) 
 ACCESS BANK  142,614,926 8.5% 
 FIRST BANK  408,504,000 24.3% 
 GT BANK  437,556,244 26.1% 
 UBA   237,102,000 14.1% 
 ZENITH  452,566,630 27.0% 
 TOTAL  1,678,343,800 100.0% 
Source: Adapted from the annual financial statement of DMBs 
Table 4 shows the profit after tax amount earned by the five banks. Zenith recorded 27% , GTB, 
26.1% while First bank is 24.3%. The implication of this result is that GTB performed very well 
using the risk and return criteria method of assessment. While GTB recorded a lower amount of off 
balance sheet engagement and lower gross loan its profit after tax remained very high when 
compared to the other banks. Zenith Bank recorded a highest amount of return at 27% of the total 
PAT for the five banks for the period under review. However this high return may be wiped off by 
the high risk potentials indicated by the huge amount of off balance sheet activities and low loan 
loss provisioning as shown in table 1. 
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Bar chart representing the tables above  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4451 
4,453 
437 
3,127 
143 
8,782 
342 
2,523 
409 
5,562 
163 
2,779 
438 
5,073 
152 
4,011 
237 
6,970 
197 
10,700 
453 
-
2,000 
4,000 
6,000 
8,000 
10,000 
12,000 
GROSS LOAN LOAN LOSS PROV. 
RESERVE
OFF BAL. SHEET PROFIT AFTER TAX
M
ill
io
n
s
Gross Loans, Loan Loss Prov, Off Bal. Sheet & Profit After Tax 
ACCESS BANK
FIRST BANK
GT BANK
UBA 
ZENITH
4,453,24
5,346 
8,782,48
2,000 
5,562,21
6,969 
5,072,70
8,000 
6,970,47
7,141 
GROSS LOAN                                 
(ON-BALANCE SHEET)
ACCESS BANK
FIRST BANK
GT BANK
UBA 
ZENITH
Vision 2020: Innovation Management, Development Sustainability, and Competitive Economic Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations  
From the above result it was found that Nigeria deposit money banks gross loan increased when compared 
to previous years as a result of their active involvement in off-balance sheet activities. More than 50% of 
the gross loan for the period under review were from two major banks Zenith and First Banks. The increase 
in the gross loan for the period may be connected to the huge amount accrued from the off-balance sheet 
activities. The study also established that the low amount recorded as loan loss provisioning indicates that 
the banks are not adequately covered. For instance, Zenith Bank with a huge amount of off balance sheet 
engagement at 46% only made provisions on loan loss of 15%. This shows that in the event of market 
volatilities or shocks, the exposure of Zenith Bank will be too high. The PAT also showed a remarkable 
improvement when compared to previous figures. 
4452 
3,127,365
,347 
2,522,633
,000 
2,779,418
,663 4,010,623
,000 
10,700,36
7,155 
OFF BAL. SHEET
ACCESS BANK
FIRST BANK
GT BANK
UBA 
ZENITH
142,614,9
26 
408,504,0
00 
437,556,2
44 237,102,0
00 
452,566,6
30 
PROFIT AFTER TAX
ACCESS BANK
FIRST BANK
GT BANK
UBA 
ZENITH
Vision 2020: Innovation Management, Development Sustainability, and Competitive Economic Growth 
 
 
 
 
This study therefore recommends that the management and the board of Directors of the five banks should 
exercise caution when engaging in off balance sheet activities inorder to avert imminent abuse and possible 
losses. The board should not abdicate their oversight functions inorder to curtail the risk exposures of the 
affected banks. Also the monetary authorities should make and enforce laws that will benchmark the total 
amount allowed by a bank in off balance sheet activities. 
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